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Abstract
The dynamic and collaborative nature of mobile and sensor networks raises the issue of how connected mobile
devices can be trusted. Despite the existing security paradigms such as cryptographic mechanisms, and reputation and
trust models, the assurance of security remains a problem of such environments. These networks have been plagued
with internal security issues such as the presence of untrusted nodes that misbehave. Depending on the proportion of
misbehaving nodes and their strategies, attacks such as collusions may occur. By covering up malicious behaviour of
one another from the remaining part of the network, two or more malicious nodes may collaborate to cause damage to
or disrupt the network. The concept of the Dynamic Data-Driven Application Systems paradigm has been suggested
for use in diverse ﬁelds. This paper proposes a novel framework that utilises the paradigm in the area of reputation and
trust-based systems in mobile networks. The proposed framework is critically evaluated and compared with existing
work. This framework, which is applicable to social and behavioural modelling in networks, has the advantage
of monitoring and predicting the future trustworthiness of members and highlighting malicious regions within the
network.
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1. Introduction
In the context of networks, when a node is trusted, it implicitly means that the probability that it will perform an
action that is beneﬁcial or at least not detrimental in the network is high enough to consider engaging in some form
of cooperation with the node [1]. Reputation, on the other hand, is the opinion of one entity about another; it is a
measure of the trustworthiness of a node. Both trust and reputation have been used synonymously and adapted to
mobile networks.
Behavioural expectation within a mobile network is motivated from a social perspective, where individuals are
expected to behave in certain ways within the society. The behaviour of an individual, whether good or bad, will
determine how others will cooperate with the individual. The expected behaviour of nodes in a network for example,
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is to be cooperative in the routing and forwarding of packets to neighbouring nodes. Misbehaviour among nodes is
the deviation from the expected behaviour of nodes in a network. Misbehaving nodes are said to be malicious.
Several solutions have been proposed to address the security issues in these networks [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Reputation
and Trust-based Models (RTMs) are described as systems that provide mechanisms to produce a metric encapsulating
reputation for a given domain for each identity within the system [8]. RTMs aim to provide information that allow
nodes to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy nodes and encourage nodes to behave as expected. The
participation of malicious nodes in network activity is discouraged by the RTMs and malicious nodes are isolated,
denied service and punished.
Each model addresses some but not all of the problems or in the process of solving a problem, they introduce other
problems. An example is the problem of collusion attack, where two or more nodes team up to behave maliciously.
Without countermeasures, the eﬀects of this attack have been shown to dramatically aﬀect the security and network
performance at runtime as evidenced in poor reliability and quality of service, higher overhead and throughput degra-
dation [3].
The models rely on individual nodes to determine the trust value of the other nodes in the network. More im-
portantly, the prediction of future levels of trustworthiness is not the main focus of the RTMs; they focus mainly on
the online reputation and trust of network members. We argue that the existing models lack the level of dynamism
required in these networks, which calls for an equally dynamic approach in addressing issues.
The Dynamic Data-Driven Application Systems (DDDAS) [9, 10] paradigm has been applied in diverse ﬁelds.
Of particular interest are social networks where the utilisation of DDDAS is not extensive [11, 12, 13]. Our research
focuses on utilising the paradigm for reputation and trust systems in dynamic and mobile environments.
In an earlier paper [14], we proposed an architecture that aids the elimination of the problem of collusion within a
network. This is achieved by a central entity that facilitates the collection of data and provides runtime trust values.
In this paper, we extend the central entity to form part of a DDDAS controller that we propose. The idea is that the
controller does not only collect the data, but it also predicts future behaviour of nodes. This paper shows how DDDAS
is an appropriate paradigm for predicting trust related problems in mobile and sensor networks. Our contribution
is a framework capable of providing dynamic changes to trust ratings of nodes at runtime and predicting the future
behaviour of nodes through the simulation of historical data and online behaviour.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes existing reputation and trust-based
models and the existing problems. The motivation for the use of the DDDAS paradigm in this research is discussed
in Section 3. The proposed framework for reputation systems is described in the following section. Section 5 details
the challenges and the future direction of this research and the last section summarises the paper.
2. Reputation and Trust-based Models
A suggested approach for addressing security issues in mobile and sensor networks is the use of public key
and identity-based cryptography. These mechanisms, though eﬀective, are not very suitable due to the limitation of
node resources. Cryptographic solutions are limited by the fact that adversaries can gain access to valid keys by
physically compromising a node. Compromised nodes can then insert bogus data into the network [4]. Despite the
fact that researchers have come up with less computational intensive cryptographic mechanisms, several limitations
remain. These include high mobility, limited memory, the processing and battery power of nodes to mention a few
[15, 16, 17, 18].
Due to the inadequacy of cryptographic mechanisms, researchers proposed RTMs, which have shown positive
results. Michiardi and Molva [2] proposed a model where reputation is formed and updated with time by direct
observations and information provided by other members of the network. Nodes have to contribute continuously
to the community to remain trusted else, their reputation will be degraded until they are eventually excluded from
the network. The model gives a higher weight to past behaviour. The authors argue that a more recent sporadic
misbehaviour should have minimal inﬂuence on a node’s reputation that has been built over a long period of time.
Buchegger et al. [3] proposed a protocol that aims to detect and isolate misbehaving nodes, making it unattractive
for any node to deny cooperation with others. In this framework, each node maintains a reputation rating and a
trust rating about every other node of interest. Only fresh reputation is propagated in the network, with more weight
given to the current behaviour of a node over its past behaviour. Nodes monitor and detect misbehaviour in their
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neighbourhood by means of an enhanced packet acknowledgment (PACK) mechanism; where the conﬁrmation of
acknowledgment comes indirectly by overhearing the next node forward the packet [19, 20].
In the work of Ganeriwal et al. [4], which is applicable to wireless sensor networks, each sensor node maintains
reputation metrics. These metrics represent the past behaviour of other nodes and are used as an inherent aspect in
predicting their future behaviour. The model relies on network members to maintain the reputation of others based on
their experiences and uses this to evaluate their trustworthiness.
The more recent studies on reputation systems are discussed in [5, 6, 7]. A common problem of some of the
models includes vulnerability to collusion attacks and vulnerability to false praise or accusations [21]. The problem
is as a result of the use of a distributed approach to information gathering about node behaviour. That is, each node
keeps a record about the behaviour of other nodes of interest. The recommendations provided by individual nodes in
the network are used in deciding the reputation of other nodes. Also, reputation information is stored and circulated
by each node, which may lead to collusions and network congestion. While the distributed approach oﬀers robustness
and scalability, there is no repository that collates reputation information.
The RTMsmake use of a component resident on each node calledwatchdogmechanism. This component monitors
its neighbourhood and gathers data by promiscuous observation. By promiscuous observation we mean that each node
overhears the transmission of neighbouring nodes to detect misbehaviour. If the watchdog notices the neighbour’s
transmission matches the expected template transmission, a positive reputation value is stored in the appropriate table.
Once misbehaviour is detected, a negative reputation value is stored. This detection mechanism has a weakness of
failing to detect a misbehaving node in case of collusions [22]. Figure 1 depicts a form of collusion attack showing
the downside of the watchdog mechanism.
Figure 1. Node misbehaviour
In a normal situation, node A forwards the packet to node B and B forwards the packet to node C. Node C then
forwards the packet to node D. However, node C may decide to alter the packet before sending it to D. Furthermore,
node B colludes with C by refusing to notify A of node C’s action. With the watchdog mechanism, it is possible that
B does not report to A when C alters a packet P to P#, before forwarding or dropping the packet. Malicious nodes in
promiscuous mode do not only have the chance to collude but can also capture sensitive data such as passwords and
personal identiﬁcation numbers being exchanged.
Let us consider a similar attack where two nodes A and B are controlled by an attacker. If A tells B all of its secrets,
then B can masquerade as A to all of B’s neighbours that node A shares pair wise keys with and vice versa. The keys
from each subsequently obtained node, can be reused by the other attacker controlled nodes, cascading the impact of
the compromise. Therefore, an attacker can control a node undetectably by physically compromising the node, and
the node in turn compromising other nodes within the network [23].
Another problem of the existing models is that they lack a high level of dynamism required for such spontaneous
networks. We refer to dynamism in terms of the provision of runtime ratings by the models and prediction of the
future behaviour of each member of the network. These models focus mainly on current Trust Values (TVs) of the
nodes, with little or no focus on predicting future TVs.
The small size of network nodes limits their computational power, preventing them from carrying out the complex
analysis required by some models. Extra computation in accepting observed reputation information from other nodes
remains a problem. Also, these models lack well-analysed approaches to determine the bias of each node [5]. Trust
decisions can be corrupted through recommendations made by nodes and malicious nodes can modify data packets,
as shown in Figure 1.
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3. Why Dynamic Data-Driven Application Systems?
The dynamic and volatile nature of mobile and sensor networks make it diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate between normal
and malicious network behaviour. This nature therefore, calls for an equally dynamic approach to identifying and
isolating misbehaving nodes. In traditional reputation systems, there are some missing elements that are listed below:
i. Provision of dynamic TVs of network members to identify malicious nodes at runtime,
ii. Prediction of future TVs of nodes to prevent nodes from misbehaving and
iii. Network organisation into regions of risk to focus on regions of high risk.
To ﬁll the missing gaps, a framework with the following characteristics is required:
i. Provides dynamic runtime rating of nodes using data provided from the network,
ii. Prevents nodes’ bias from inﬂuencing trust decisions and
iii. Predicts the future TVs by analysing the behaviour of individual nodes over time.
Current research in DDDAS focus on simulation of physical, artiﬁcial or social entities. The simulation is able to
make predictions about how the entity would evolve and its future state. The predictions made by the simulation can
then inﬂuence how and where future data will be gathered from the entity, in order to focus on areas of uncertainty
[11].
Hence, the DDDAS paradigm is that of a symbiotic relationship between reality and simulations. The application
of the paradigm’s concept in this framework provides dynamism in the detection of malicious nodes and prediction
of future behaviour. The runtime behaviour (data) of nodes is simulated to gain a better understanding and a more
accurate prediction of the level of trust for each node. This predictive capability is similar to the model suggested
in [4]. Here, each sensor node maintains reputation metrics, which represent the past behaviour of other nodes. The
reputation metrics are used to predict future behaviour of nodes.
By employing DDDAS, the simulation is capable of dynamically measuring trust levels, and continually incorpo-
rating new data at runtime. The output from the simulation will help control the network in terms of decisions to be
made in order to maintain a trusted network.
4. Framework for dynamic trust monitoring and prediction
This section introduces the framework and gives a comparative analysis with pre-existing ones. Figure 2 depicts
a conceptual architecture of the framework and Table 1 compares the existing models with our proposed model using
the criteria described in this section.
At initialisation, each node is assigned a neutral TV until they are able to demonstrate their trustworthiness or
maliciousness. The observed behaviour of each node will determine the adjustment of their TVs accordingly. In
the framework, useful data is selected from a stream of data from the network and is dynamically injected into
the controller to determine the current TVs of network members. The simulation of the entire network utilises the
processed data to predict the future behaviour of members. The ﬁnal aim of the system is to group nodes into diﬀerent
regions of trust depending on their level of trust. This enables decision makers and other stakeholders to focus on
regions of high risk.
Considering the calculation of TVs, the model described by [2] gives a higher weight to past behaviour. The
authors argue that a more recent sporadic misbehaviour should have minimal inﬂuence on a node’s reputation, which
has been built over a long period of time. In contrast, in the approach of [3, 19], the current behaviour of a node carries
more weight to prevent nodes from obtaining a good reputation and subsequently, misbehaving. The latter approach
is adopted in this research, with a higher weight given to recent behaviour. This is described further in Section 4.2.
By comparing the historical behaviour of a node with its online behaviour, runtime dynamic change in rating is
incorporated in trust ratings and misbehaving nodes are detected. This is based on the assumption that the behaviour
of a malicious node is diﬀerent from its expected behaviour. Using as an example, a scenario of criminal monitoring
with each suspect having a mobile phone, the expectation is that the phone is used within a certain geographical
radius. When an untrusted individual that violates the expected behaviour (using techniques such as text mining or
voice recognition) is detected by the controller, adjustments can be made such as a response of exclusion from the rest
of the network.
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Figure 2. High-level diagram showing the components of the proposed framework
As discussed in Section 2, reputation-based systems lack eﬀective mechanisms for monitoring reputation infor-
mation. They rely on the promiscuous mode of monitoring (an assumption that is not always true in a real network).
Consequently, they inherit the watchdog’s detection weakness [24]. In the process of capturing information about
nodes, these systems introduce additional problems such as collusion attacks. Therefore, there is a need for an eﬀec-
tive approach tomonitoring the behaviour of nodes. This is addressed in the proposed framework with the introduction
of a monitoring function by Cluster Heads (CHs). The network is physically partitioned into clusters and each clus-
ter has a head. Upon entering the network, each node registers its presence with a CH. Each CH has a direct link
with all members of its cluster and overhears all the communication between the members. The CH is responsible
for information gathering; that is, the collection of data. This therefore does not require member nodes to operate
in promiscuous mode. It is assumed that the CHs have a higher capacity in terms of computational power, energy,
and storage compared to other network nodes. The function of CHs is to monitor the nodes in their cluster; they are
therefore not susceptible to collusion attacks.
The information that is gathered from the simulation help to identify regions of high-risk, medium-risk and low-
risk in the network. Nodes are then assigned to the diﬀerent regions, depending on their reputation (as depicted in
Figure 2). The grouping helps in the management of the network by focusing on critical group of nodes that require
more attention. This will equally aid future security-aware decisions in the network.
The components of our proposed model are described below:
4.1. Physical system
In the framework (see Figure 2), the physical system comprises of nodes in a network exchanging information
or collaborating with each other. Nodes may, for example, be in the form of mobile phones, payment cards or other
tokens with a unique identity. Each node belongs to a region of trust which may either be of high-risk, medium-risk
or low-risk as shown in Table 2.
The reputation of a node is the collection of ratings maintained by the controller about this node. The reputation
of a given region is determined by the collective ratings of the member nodes. The regions of trust will depend on
how the network evolves over time and the idea of clustering (described earlier) is a physical structure of the network.
The role of the CH is to constantly monitor the behaviour of nodes and to act as an online data source in the
network. The CHs are responsible for gathering online data instead of the nodes; the CHs perform this function
by operating in a promiscuous mode, enabling them to overhear all transmissions between nodes. This approach is
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Table 1. Summary table comparing existing reputation and trust models with proposed framework
Criteria / Model [2] [3] [4] Framework
Information
Representation
Heuristic ap-
proach using a
reputation table
with each entry
representing a
function
Bayesian ap-
proach, where
ratings are
an estimation
of the actual
probability of
misbehaviour
Bayesian formu-
lation based on
decision theory
Trust formulation
with each node
having a proba-
bilistic discrete
value
Information
Gathering
First and
second hand in-
formation from
neighbouring
nodes
First and
second hand in-
formation from
neighbouring
nodes
Integration
of direct and
second hand
observations
Observations in
the form of data
from sensors to
the controller
Monitoring Watchdog
mechanism
Packet ac-
knowledgment,
Watchdog
mechanism
Watchdog
mechanism
Monitoring of di-
rectly connected
nodes by cluster
heads
Simulation Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Simulation of
physical network
Response Isolation Isolation Exclusion
(avoidance)
Domain depen-
dent
Dynamism Ratings are not
constant
Periodically
updated
Provides real
time feedback
Runtime ratings
and feedback
Prediction Not applicable Not applicable Trust metric that
is representative
of a nodes’ fu-
ture behaviour
Prediction of trust
values by simula-
tion, where values
are a probability
of misbehaviour
adopted because recommendations made by the individual nodes give room for collusions and other attacks such as,
false accusations and praises.
4.2. Controller
The data controller works with the CHs to obtain and ﬁlter data. It is assumed that the controller is secure from
any form of attack. Depending on the domain of application, it is possible to have back-up controllers in order to
avoid a single point of failure and to provide redundancy within the framework.
The approach adopted in this framework is such that runtime data about node behaviour is forwarded to the
controller. The data is then transformed into a corresponding value, which is used to calculate the online TV of each
node. The controller includes an Aggregator, a Data Transformer, a Trust Value Calculator, a Data Repository and
the Simulation, described below:
• Aggregator: Data, which is a representation of the behaviour and collaboration among nodes, is collected from
the data sources. The requirement for data to be admitted into the controller is to meet the speciﬁed criteria.
The criteria help in identifying relevant data such as data about nodes with a low TV, or nodes in the high-risk
region and simply discard irrelevant data. Using the scenario of a criminal-monitoring network for example,
the collaboration of an individual with a suspect is ﬂagged as important data to be added. The collected data
reﬂects the current state of the network at a speciﬁc point in time.
• Data transformer: In order for a reputation system to function as it ought to, observations and experiences
have to be captured and represented numerically. That is, the qualitative data captured need to converted to
a quantitative data. Therefore, node behaviour is captured, quantiﬁed and measured by an associated TV.
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Table 2. Trust table showing the degrees of trust and corresponding regions of risk
Trust
Value
Meaning Description Region
5 Complete
trust
Trusted node
with an excel-
lent reputation
Low risk
4 Good trust
level
Very reliable
node
Low risk
3 Average
trust level
Average value
and somewhat
reliable node
Medium risk
2 Average
trust level
Average value
but question-
able node
Medium risk
1 Poor trust
level
A questionable
node
High risk
0 Complete
distrust
Malicious
node with a
bad reputation
High risk
Every behavioural expectation in the network has a corresponding value and the collection of these values will
eventually determine a node’s online TV. The act of collaborating with a suspected malicious individual, with a
predeﬁned value of 1 for example, will result in a downgrade of the TV of a trusted node.
A set of discrete trust values is assumed in the framework and each value represents a degree of trust as described
in Table 2. These discrete degrees of trust introduce ﬂexibility into the application of our framework, because
diﬀerent behaviours correspond to diﬀerent levels of trust. Data that has been collected from the network is
then transformed into a form that can be used to determine the tv of each node. The data is converted to a value
ranging from [0, 5], where a score of 0 means a node is completely untrusted, 5 means a node is absolutely
trusted and if 0 < TV < 5, then it implies that the node is trusted to a certain extent.
• Trust value calculator: Computing trust in RTMs has been described as an abstract mathematical speciﬁcation of
how available information should be transformed into a usable metric [8]. In this framework, the speciﬁcation is
made through explicit equations, discussed below in this section. Trust computation is very diﬃcult, as trust has
to be deﬁned in a very precise way because the computation of trust is crucial to the fulﬁlment of the functions
of any trust-based framework.
Nodes are expected to act in certain ways and the expected behaviour is domain dependent. We model the
expected behaviour in the framework with predeﬁned values and any contrary action in the domain is ﬂagged
as a possible malicious attack and a downgrade of the trust rating of the node.
The TV’s of network members are dynamically updated at speciﬁed time intervals j in our framework, where
j = {1, 2, ..., i-1}. Note that i represents the current time while i-1 is the last time a snapshot of the
physical system was taken. Using the notation of tvh to represent the historical TV, we deﬁne the trust value
tvh of a node with time to be
tv(i)h =
1
i-1
i−1∑
j=1
(tvn)( j) (1)
That is,
tv(i)h =
(tvn)(1) + (tvn)(2) + (tvn)(3) + ... + (tvn)(i−1)
i-1
(2)
which is the average of the sum of the previous TVs up until the time i-1. We denote the online TV, derived
from nodes’ recent activity as tvo. This is the sum of observations captured and represented numerically for
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each node. The new TV tvn of a node at time i is deﬁned as
tv(i)n =
((μhtvh) + (μotvo))
(i)
μhμo
(3)
Weights μo and μh (factors for the online and historical TVs respectively) are introduced to control the eﬀect
of historical behaviour of nodes on their new TVs. In the framework, [μo, μh] > 0 and μo > μh, thereby
placing more emphasis on recent behaviour. For example, let us consider a node with an average historical
value of 3 and online value of 4, if μh = 2 and μo = 3, we obtain tvn = 3. The emphasis on online behaviour
prevents nodes from gaining trust by behaving as expected over a sustained period of time and only then start
to misbehave; referred to as an intoxication attack [19, 25]. This attack occurs because the eﬀect of historical
good behaviour outweighs the eﬀect of current actions on reputation.
• Data repository: Within this framework, it is assumed that nodes have a veriﬁable and persistent identity at-
tached to their behaviour. The repository acts as a historical data source and archive. The information represen-
tation function is performed by storing the trust value of every network member on a reputation table, with each
row of the table containing the TVs of a uniquely identiﬁable node. Historical behaviour of nodes are stored as
TVs and fetched from the data repository to be used as evidence in order to predict future possible values.
• Simulation: The aim of the simulation is to identify regions of high-risk, medium-risk and low-risk as described
earlier. Although the physical network is divided into clusters, nodes are assigned to regions based on their
level of risk to the network. The level of risk the node poses is determined by the probability of the nodes’
misbehaviour and considering the reputation (tvh) of the node.
Dynamic data (online behaviour) are incorporated in the simulation, which helps with the analysis and pre-
diction of node reputation. We are interested in modelling the application level behaviour of each node in
the system rather than the low level protocols involved in the network. To this end, the proposed framework
utilises an agent-based simulation: Repast1 to implement its predictive capabilities. Based on the behavioural
rules incorporated into the nodes in the simulation, the predicted TVs of each node change using probabilities
of collaboration among the nodes. These changes are indicators of the possible expectations in the physical
system.
If there are any discrepancies between the predicted value and the TVs in reality, questions are raised and the
role of the simulation is to ﬁnd answers to the questions. Assuming a node A (in a low-risk region) collaborates
with a node B (in a high-risk region), what happens to the TV of node A? Will A be moved to a high-risk region?
What could make A and B collude? How will the regions evolve over time? These scenarios are considered
using the agent-based simulation.
The simulation considers the probability of a node misbehaving and the probability of collaboration between the
two or more nodes. This is done using the predeﬁned behavioural rules incorporated in the nodes in simulation.
The simulation system uses a continuous learning process that uses knowledge converted from captured evi-
dence to predict future possible behaviour of nodes. This component improves the predictive capability of the
framework and provides adequate feedback that enables for example, the administrator to manage and control
the network by making security-aware decisions.
5. Future work and discussion
Ad hoc networks are traditionally known to lack a central entity; therefore, this framework will be most applicable
in semi-ad hoc or sensor network environments that lend themselves to centralised control. An example is in high-risk
domains such as the military and in criminal monitoring, which require high-level of security in terms of trust and
central control, but need to conserve the mobile nature of the network.
1http://repast.sourceforge.net/
1248 O. nolaja et al. / Procedia Comp ter cie ce 1 ( 2) 241–1250
O.O. Onolaja et al. / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2010) 1–10 9
Data mining for discovering patterns in data obtained is a challenge in this research because valid patterns of node
behaviour have to be detected as data is collected. The interpretation of the data and the translation to trust values is
important to the success of this work. An appropriate prediction technique, which ensures that accurate predictions
are made, serves as a direction of future work. The dynamic and mission critical nature of the applicable domains
set strict time constraints in communication. For instance, the detection of criminal behaviour should be immediately
communicated to the police.
The proposed system is currently being implemented, using Repast as a simulation toolkit. Once complete, we
anticipate the use of the system in real-life applications such as criminal monitoring. As a ﬁrst case study, we envision
a scenario of tracing suspects (nodes) by their phone usage (behaviour) with the provider substations acting as CHs.
Rigorous tests will be carried out through the simulation of the model and analysis of the results in order to ascertain
the eﬀectiveness of this framework, in achieving a better overall security.
6. Conclusion
This paper proposes a dynamic reputation and trust-based framework that is able to predict the behaviour of
network members in the future. Our framework provides a high level of dynamism to reputation systems by updating
the trust values of nodes at runtime. In addition, the framework is useful for grouping network members into diﬀerent
regions of trust in order to focus on regions of high-risk. The proposed approach is not only useful at the network
level but at a higher level, providing adequate information that allows for countermeasures and making security
aware decisions in the network by stakeholders. It can therefore be concluded that the use of runtime monitoring
and measurement, simulation of the physical system, feedback in terms of prediction and control mechanisms, can
potentially improve the security in reputation and trust systems.
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